Platform Profile

MAGURA V5, V7 and MV11: Ukraine's Naval Drones

August 2026 | Uncrewed Surface Vessels | Updated 27 August 2026 with the MV11 specification release

Bottom Line Up Front

The MAGURA family is the most combat-productive uncrewed surface vessel yet fielded, credited by Ukrainian military intelligence with 17 targets hit and 15 destroyed, including three Russian warships sunk in five weeks in early 2024, two helicopters and two fighter aircraft. No Magura has been publicly confirmed to sink a Russian warship since 5 March 2024, and the Black Sea Fleet's withdrawal eastward is a major reason. The platform did not stop attacking surface vessels: Magura crews destroyed two patrol boats off western Crimea on 30 May 2024. What followed was diversification rather than replacement. Air-to-air missiles appeared on Magura hulls in the same period, and from 2026 those hulls began carrying aerial drones to launch points off the Crimean coast against air defenses ashore. The three roles draw on three different supply chains, and that is the constraint that will decide which of them scales. In August 2026 the carrier role acquired a hull of its own, when UFORCE unveiled the MV11, a 12 meter vessel built to stay at sea for a week rather than to be spent on arrival. It was shown carrying 18 vertically launched Sting interceptors, and the manufacturer states that its preferred configuration is an offshore air-defense platform.

Origins and Lineage

From a Fishing Boat to a Production Design

The MAGURA did not begin as a design bureau program. Four Ukrainian engineers were tasked by the country's security service in the early summer of 2022 to "do something with enemy fleet," and they built the first vessel from a 6 meter fishing boat hull.1 The deck was cut down and covered with a ridge running along the centerline, producing a profile low enough to be difficult to see and difficult to hit. A modest outboard motor supplied the drive.

The next two iterations came quickly. The second replaced the outboard with jet-ski propulsion in a canoe-like hull with breakwaters across the deck, lowering the profile further. The third, operational by October 2022, was slightly larger, buried a warhead of roughly 150 kg in the hull and was the first version that could be built in numbers in dispersed workshops.2 A fourth type with a larger hull and an outboard motor stayed experimental. The V5 that reached public attention at a Turkish defense exhibition in July 2023 was therefore the fifth iteration of a design already more than a year old.

The numbering of those early generations should be treated as a convention rather than an official sequence. UFORCE, which manufactures the family today, stated in May 2026 that it "has never produced a V3 version" and that no such model exists.3 The company is describing its own product line, and the craft catalogued as V1 through V4 were built before that company existed. Both statements can hold, and the useful conclusion is that pre-V5 designations came from developers and analysts rather than from a catalogue.

Who Operates Them

The program's institutional home moved as it matured. The originating tasking came from the security service, whose line of development became the Sea Baby. The Magura line went to the Main Directorate of Intelligence, known as HUR, and specifically to its Group 13 unit, which conducted the strikes described below. Both agencies contributed operators to the 385th Unmanned Surface Vehicles Brigade, established in August 2023 as the first military unit anywhere dedicated to naval drones.4 A third organization, the 412th Nemesis Brigade of Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces, operates a naval drone division that appears later in this account.

Specifications

Ukrainian Defence Intelligence presented the V5, the V6P and the V7 together on 15 May 2025, and that briefing is the origin of almost every performance figure in circulation.5 Several outlets reported it, and where their renderings differ the differences are informative.

Parameter MAGURA V5 MAGURA V7
Length5.5 m7.2 m
Beam1.5 mapprox. 2 m
Mass, loadedunder 1,100 kg3,400 kg (1,300 kg empty)
Payload250 kg standard, 320 kg maximum650 kg
Cruise speed22 knots23 knots
Maximum speed42 knots (78 km/h)at least 39 knots (72 km/h)
Range800 km guaranteed (450 nm)870 km, with 1,500 km cited as control range
Enduranceup to 48 hours48 hours, up to 7 days with generator
Powerplantwaterjet270 hp diesel
Fuel capacitynot published1,200 liters
Sea statenot officially publishedwaves to 1.25 m, Sea State 2 to 3
Air-to-air fit2 x R-73 (Sea Dragon)2 x AIM-9 or R-73 on elevating rails

V7 Design Changes

The V5 is a 5.5 meter planing hull sitting about half a meter above the waterline, driven by a waterjet, with the warhead carried internally in the bow.6 Navigation combines satellite and inertial systems for the transit, with electro-optical and night-vision equipment for the terminal run. Telemetry and video travel over mesh radio using aerial repeaters and over multi-channel satellite links, and redundancy across those channels is the answer to jamming rather than any single hardened path.

The V7 weighs roughly three and a half times as much and is built around a 270 horsepower diesel where the V5 uses a petrol waterjet drive.7 Two changes matter more than the size. The first is endurance: 48 hours extending to seven days when a generator sustains the electronics without running the main engine, which converts the craft from a vehicle that transits to a target into one that waits near it. The second is the payload split. A V5 carrying 320 kg carries a warhead and nothing else, so every mission ends with the boat. A V7 carrying 650 kg can carry a warhead and a weapon station, or drop the warhead and carry drones, and each of those implies the boat comes home.

Four Figures That Do Not Agree

The V7's sea state is given as 1.25 meters in the Ukrainian-language account of the briefing, which records "up to 3 Beaufort, waves up to 1.25 m," and as 1.25 meters by Defense Express, which calls it sea state 3.8 One widely republished English rendering instead gives 3 meter waves.9 Sea State 3 spans 0.5 to 1.25 meters of significant wave height and 3 meter waves are Sea State 5, so the larger figure appears to be a scale value rendered as a measurement. The manufacturer's own specification sheet settles it in favor of the smaller number, listing the V7 as operational at Sea State 2 to 3 in the Black Sea.10

That correction removes a claim that follows the platform everywhere, which is that the V7 was built to strike during winter storms when Russian aviation is grounded. A 1.25 meter limit places the craft inside the weather envelope that constrains small boats generally. What the larger hull actually buys is the ability to hold station rather than to survive worse weather, and the export literature keeps open-ocean capability in a separate product: UFORCE lists a 7.8 meter MV7 with carbon and Kevlar reinforcement rated operational at Sea State 4 and survivable at Sea State 6.10

Range carries a similar split. The same briefing produced both 870 km and 1,500 km, and one account describes the larger number as a control range specifically.5 A craft carrying 1,200 liters and cruising at 23 knots is unlikely to have 1,500 km of fuel aboard, which makes the fuel-against-control reading plausible. No burn rate has been published, so the reading stays a reading. On a one-way strike the control figure is the operational limit; on a mission the craft is meant to survive, the fuel figure is.

The mass figures leave a gap that no source explains. Empty at 1,300 kg and loaded at 3,400 kg leaves 2,100 kg for everything else, and 1,200 liters of diesel at 0.84 kg per liter is about 1,008 kg, which with the 650 kg payload accounts for 1,658 kg. Roughly 440 kg is unaccounted for. A marine diesel of that class carries heat exchangers, raw-water circuits and fluid reservoirs that are neither hull nor payload, a seven-day loiter implies battery capacity or an auxiliary power unit of real weight, and 3,400 kg may describe a maximum design displacement rather than a typical load.

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    Anti-Ship Strike Record

    MAGURA employment by role, 2024 to 2026 A timeline with three horizontal bars, one per role, running left to right from January 2024 to September 2026. Each bar marks the period in which that role has been available, and each numbered circle marks a documented engagement. Anti-surface strike runs across the whole window and carries two markers, three warships sunk between 1 February and 5 March 2024 and two KS-701 patrol boats destroyed on 30 May 2024. Air defense begins in May 2024 and carries two markers, Mi-8 helicopters destroyed on 31 December 2024 and Su-30SM aircraft engaged on 2 May 2025, with no marker after that date. Aerial drone carriage begins in March 2026 and carries two markers, a Shahed intercepted on 19 April 2026 and Crimean air defenses struck in August 2026. The three bars overlap in time rather than following one another. 2024 2025 2026 as of 18 Aug 2026 Anti-surface strike 1 2 Air defense 3 4 Aerial drone carrier 5 6 role available n documented engagement, numbered below role in use before this window

    MAGURA employment by role, 2024 to 2026. Each bar marks the period in which a role has been available. Each numbered circle marks a documented engagement. The bars overlap, and the air defense bar carries no marker after May 2025.

    1. 1 February to 5 March 2024: the corvette Ivanovets, the landing ship Tsezar Kunikov and the patrol ship Sergey Kotov sunk. No Russian warship has been publicly confirmed as sunk by a Magura since.
    2. 30 May 2024: two KS-701 Tunets patrol boats destroyed off north-western Crimea.
    3. 31 December 2024: Mi-8 helicopters engaged near Cape Tarkhankut, the first crewed aircraft killed by an uncrewed surface vessel. Ukrainian military intelligence revised the tally on 2 January 2025 to two destroyed and a third damaged.
    4. 2 May 2025: Su-30SM aircraft engaged with AIM-9 missiles about 50 km west of Novorossiysk. No surface-launched air-to-air engagement has been reported since.
    5. 19 April 2026: a Shahed-type loitering munition destroyed by an interceptor launched from an uncrewed vessel.
    6. Early August 2026: a Pantsir-S1, two S-400 launchers and an Orion control antenna struck in Crimea by FPV drones flown from Magura carriers.

    Three Warships in Five Weeks

    On the night of 1 February 2024, six Magura V5s attacked the Tarantul-III class missile corvette Ivanovets near Lake Donuzlav in occupied Crimea. The vessel sank with a crew reported at around 40.11 Thirteen days later the large landing ship Tsezar Kunikov was sunk near Alupka, and on 5 March the patrol ship Sergey Kotov followed near the Kerch Strait.12 Ukrainian intelligence attributes all three to Group 13 operating Magura V5s.

    The tactic behind them is a sequencing method the Group 13 commander has described in detail. The first drone in is what he calls the "hooligan," and its job is to reach the target and detonate wherever it can: "The first drone must reach the target because after that, we have an algorithm."6 The opening explosion disrupts the crew's coordination and degrades the ship's ability to fight the rest of the attack, and subsequent drones strike with precision. Reporting of the Ivanovets engagement describes later drones targeting the breach the preceding one had made.

    A 250 kg warhead does not sink a compartmentalized warship by itself, and the method does not ask it to. Six of them arriving in sequence against a vessel of roughly 550 tonnes produced flooding and internal detonation. That makes unit cost a tactical parameter rather than only a procurement one, because the tactic requires numbers.

    The Sergey Kotov shows the other side of the ledger. It absorbed earlier attacks and survived them, and the commander credits the defenders rather than the ship: "Sergey Kotov's team was working well together. Each of them knew what to do."6 A trained crew reacting fast with close-in weapons defeated drone boat attacks more than once before it stopped working. Neither side publishes how many drones were expended on the attempts that failed, which is the missing denominator behind every exchange ratio in this profile.

    What Changed After March 2024

    Russian naval assets moved east from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk and other mainland ports from 2023 onward, a relocation of roughly 300 km that placed them beyond convenient reach and behind harbor defenses.13 David Axe records the consequence directly: "There were zero hard kills against Russian warships between late 2024 and late 2025."14 His wider judgment is harsher than most coverage of the program, holding that uncrewed surface vessels "cannot replace fast, accurate and low-flying anti-ship cruise missiles" and remain "weapons of desperation. Or, at best, expedients that provide inexpensive munitions for bulking up a sea denial force."

    Three propositions need separating here, because they are supported to different degrees. That no further major warship has been sunk by a Magura is well supported. That high-value fleet units became substantially less accessible after the relocation is well supported. That the anti-surface mission ended is contradicted by the record. On 30 May 2024, nearly three months after the Sergey Kotov, Group 13 struck Russian craft in Vuzka bay off north-western Crimea with Magura V5s and destroyed two KS-701 Tunets high-speed patrol boats.15 Russian forces committed fighter aircraft, helicopters, small arms and 30 mm cannon against the drones and did not stop the attack.16

    That engagement dates the problem the air-defense fit was built to solve. Russian aviation was engaging drone boats at low level in May 2024, the Sea Dragon configuration appeared in roughly the same period, and the platform had no answer aboard until it did.

    Large vessels have continued to fall to Ukrainian uncrewed surface craft since. Two of them sank the Russian-flagged container ship Yanina, operated by FESCO and controlled by the state nuclear corporation Rosatom, roughly 130 nautical miles from Novorossiysk on 1 August 2026, a loss Rosatom's own chief executive confirmed.17 No source attributes that attack to a Magura or to any named platform. When Ukraine returned to Novorossiysk in force on 12 August 2026, damaging the frigates Admiral Makarov and Admiral Essen, a Buyan-M missile ship and the patrol ship Vasily Bykov, it used fifteen domestically produced systems in one package, and the uncrewed surface vessels named in that operation were the Sargan and the Mamai.18 The Magura was not among them. Ukraine's naval drone lineage now runs wide enough that the Sargan-3000 handles targets the Magura once did.

    What the Record Supports

    Attrition of the Black Sea Fleet is documented: warships damaged and sunk, the fleet displaced from its historic headquarters, and the western Black Sea opened sufficiently for Ukrainian grain shipping to resume.

    Coercion, meaning a change in Russian policy produced by that attrition, is unproven rather than disproven, and still unfolding.

    Air Defense from the Surface

    Through 2023 and into 2024 Russia destroyed Ukrainian drone boats using missile boats, corvettes, Ka-27 helicopters and strafing runs by Su-30 and MiG-29 fighters, an approach that carried a lopsided risk, because the platforms committed were far more expensive than the targets even though a strafing run spends ammunition and sortie hours rather than the aircraft itself.19 Arming the boats with air-to-air missiles converted the drones' principal threat into their target set.

    The First Aircraft Destroyed by an Uncrewed Vessel

    The Sea Dragon fit put two R-73 infrared-homing air-to-air missiles, known in NATO service as the AA-11 Archer, on fixed rails bolted to a modified V5 deck from around May 2024. Launching an air-to-air missile from the surface costs it a substantial share of its envelope, because it has no launch velocity from a parent aircraft and must climb out of dense air near sea level. The R-73 reaches 30 to 40 km when fired from an aircraft; no published estimate of its surface-launched envelope exists.

    On 31 December 2024 near Cape Tarkhankut in western Crimea, a Group 13 Magura V5 engaged Russian Mi-8 helicopters. Ukrainian military intelligence initially reported one destroyed and a second hit and surviving, returning to base after deploying infrared flares.20 It revised the claim on 2 January 2025 to two helicopters destroyed and a third damaged.55 Russia has confirmed neither account. The commander described the boat as deployed specifically to hunt air targets rather than to run a strike and defend itself, which inverts the usual relationship between a drone boat and an aircraft.21 It was the first destruction of a crewed aircraft by an uncrewed surface vessel.

    The Su-30 Engagement

    On 2 May 2025, roughly 50 km west of Novorossiysk, three Magura V7s engaged Russian Su-30SM fighters with AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles. Two of the three boats fired. Kyrylo Budanov, head of HUR, confirmed the engagement and called it "a historical moment."22 Ukraine claims two aircraft destroyed.

    Corroboration comes from the Russian side informally rather than officially. Russian military commentators acknowledged aircrew who ejected and were recovered by civilian sailors, and their accounts are consistent with one aircraft lost rather than two. No Russian official acknowledgment has appeared and no wreckage imagery has been published. The outlet that covered the claim the following day stated plainly that it could not independently verify the Ukrainian account, and that caveat still stands.22

    The engineering is deliberately austere. The missiles sit on fixed rails that adjust in elevation only, and the operator aims in azimuth by turning the whole 7.2 meter vessel toward the aircraft, relying on the seeker's wide field of view to acquire from a deck that is pitching and rolling.23 Avoiding a traversing turret saves the weight, the power and the radar return a turret would cost. The tactical geometry is equally simple: Russian aircraft came low to strafe the boats, and low is where a surface-launched infrared missile can reach them.

    Which Missile Remains Unresolved

    Three AIM-9 variants appear across reporting of the engagement. H I Sutton's catalogue records the V7 as carrying AIM-9L rounds; several outlets say AIM-9M; one Ukrainian platform reports AIM-9X. The publication that examined the identification directly concluded only that the boats "were armed with AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles" without specifying further.

    Every AIM-9 is an infrared homing missile and none is semi-active. What separates the generations is the seeker. The AIM-9L and AIM-9M use point-source infrared seekers, the M being an L with a reduced-smoke motor, revised electronics and better resistance to infrared countermeasures, and both are widely held in European stocks.24 The AIM-9X Block II is current production with a focal-plane-array imaging seeker, high off-boresight capability and thrust vectoring.25 The distinction matters financially, because the candidates differ in unit cost by more than two to one, and that spread runs straight into the economics examined below.

    Carrying Aerial Drones

    From 2026 the Magura stopped being the munition and became the vehicle that delivers one. Hulls carried FPV drones to launch points a short distance off the Crimean coast and released them against targets inland, which gave the platform a target set that cannot be relocated the way a fleet can.

    Crimean Air Defenses, August 2026

    HUR reported on 7 August 2026 that Group 13 had used Magura naval platforms as floating carriers for FPV drones, which flew from the platforms to strike a camouflaged Pantsir-S1 and a military crane on land.26 The agency valued the Pantsir at roughly $15 million. Group 13 operators had struck a Podlyot radar control vehicle and a Parol-4 radar interrogator in Crimea by the same method shortly before.

    On 10 August Ukrainian Defence Intelligence released video of Magura drones launching FPVs against two S-400 Triumf launchers and an antenna controlling Orion drones.27 HUR assessed Russian losses from that operation at tens of millions of dollars. UFORCE, promoting the same strikes in support of a bid for a US prize competition, put the figure at approximately $80 million.28 Open-source analysis assessed that one of the two launchers shown was likely a decoy.29 The higher valuation comes from the party with a commercial interest and exceeds the operating agency's own estimate, which is the relevant fact about it.

    Camouflage did not help. The Pantsir had been covered and the FPV operators found it and destroyed it anyway, which measures the resolution of the approach: a first-person view camera at short range defeats concealment that would work against a satellite pass or a high-altitude sensor.

    Why Launching from the Sea Works

    A coastal air-defense system is laid out against threats arriving by air from seaward and inland approaches at altitude. An FPV launched from a boat a few kilometers offshore arrives low, slow and on a bearing the radar coverage was not designed to hold, and it spends little time inside the jamming envelope because the launch point sits close to the target. The general contest between drones and jamming is covered in this site's reference on electronic warfare.

    The carrier also solves a control problem that has nothing to do with range. A first-person view drone needs line of sight to its operator, and the earth's curvature makes that impossible to sustain from a shore station across 100 km of water. A boat is a relay that moves. That reasoning holds whether or not any individual hull is recovered, and it is the strongest argument for the role. This is the maritime instance of the architecture examined on this site in drone motherships.

    The technique is not exclusive to the Magura. The security service's Sea Baby carries six to eight FPV drones in side compartments that open during an attack, according to Russian accounts, alongside thermobaric rockets, and some of the launched drones use fiber-optic guidance that is immune to radio jamming.30 The security service claims the pioneering role for the concept.

    A Drone Boat That Shot Down a Shahed

    On 19 April 2026 the naval drone division of the 412th Nemesis Brigade destroyed a Russian Shahed-type loitering munition with an interceptor drone launched from an uncrewed surface vessel.31 The interceptor was a STING. The Unmanned Systems Forces stated that "using surface drone carriers to deploy interceptor drones expands air defense options and creates an additional layer of protection for Ukrainian cities."

    The vessel was never officially identified. Reporting notes that the brigade operates Magura-class craft and that a Magura-series drone received a modification in March 2026 designed to launch interceptors, and that is the whole basis for the attribution.32 The operational logic holds whatever the hull. Russia routes Shahed attacks against Odesa and other southern cities over the Black Sea, and a seaborne interceptor layer moves the engagement line offshore. A single interceptor drone costs around $5,000 against a Shahed valued between $48,000 and $100,000, where a Patriot round costs approximately $4 million.31

    The MV11 Carrier

    What UFORCE Has Disclosed

    UFORCE presented the MV11 on the Dnipro River in Kyiv on 24 August 2026, during a parade marking Ukraine's 35th Independence Day that its organizers billed as the first composed entirely of unmanned systems. The company describes it as the largest vessel in the MAGURA family.56

    UFORCE released payload and endurance on the day, up to 2,200 kg and up to seven days at sea without servicing, and Ukrainian coverage reported the vessel's characteristics as classified.5658 The rest followed a day later. The MV11 runs 12 meters overall on a 3.5 meter beam, carries more than 2 tonnes across distances above 2,000 nautical miles, and holds 10 cubic meters of free internal volume for payload integration.646573 UFORCE calls it the largest autonomous uncrewed surface vessel in Europe, builds it for open ocean work, and draws on the hull experience of the Portuguese-built MV7.73

    MV11: What UFORCE Has Disclosed

    Length overall12 m
    Beam3.5 m
    PayloadUp to 2,200 kg (4,850 lb); stated as above 2 tonnes at range
    RangeOver 2,000 nautical miles carrying over 2 tonnes
    EnduranceUp to seven days at sea without servicing
    Internal volume10 m³ free space for payload integration
    Demonstrated load18 vertically launched Sting interceptors
    Stated air-defense fitSeveral dozen interceptors, gyrostabilized 12.7 mm turret, search and tracking radar
    Design originUFORCE design and research bureau, Portugal; company headquarters in London
    First shown24 August 2026, Dnipro River, Kyiv
    Still unpublishedDisplacement, propulsion, speed, control architecture, unit cost, production timeline

    The MV11 runs half as long again as the largest hull the family previously held. UFORCE lists the MV7 at 7.8 meters and the Magura V7 at 7.1 to 7.3 meters.59 The 3.5 meter beam widens the MV7's 2.35 meters by a similar proportion, which is what a flat working deck takes.

    The MV11 covers 2,000 nautical miles inside seven days at a sustained 12 knots, where both figures describe one sortie. The V7 and MV7 make roughly 39 knots. At 12 knots the MV11 cannot follow strike craft through an operation, so it takes station before the mission opens and holds it, and the aircraft it releases set the tempo. Separate profiles would raise its transit speed and cut its time on station, and it still cannot do both in one sortie.

    Kyiv Post put the MV11 at 7 meters on 25 August and credited the figure to Oboronka.66 Oboronka published no dimension in either its English or its Ukrainian edition, and carried payload and endurance alone.67 A 7 meter hull would undercut the 7.8 meter MV7 while carrying three times its payload and a vertical launcher array.

    UFORCE unveiled the MV11 at a public event. Defence Intelligence presented the V5, V6P and V7 on 15 May 2025, and no reporting attributes the MV11 to Group 13. On 27 August 2026 UFORCE's product page listed the Magura USV, the MV7 and the Magura V7 without the MV11.59 A marketing page can lag a briefing, so the omission dates the disclosure.

    UFORCE has published no unit cost. The exchange-ratio table in the next section charges every asset committed to a mission in full, because recovery is unpublished across the family, so it would charge one complete MV11 hull against a valued target set. Neither figure exists.

    The vessel appears as MV11 in most reporting and as V11 in some, following the company's existing MV7 export designation alongside the Defence Intelligence designations V5 and V7.6061 Searches on the unqualified string "Magura V11" return hydraulic brake components made by Magura GmbH, a German manufacturer unconnected to the vessel.

    The Interceptor Load

    The MV11 has been shown in one configuration. It carries 18 Sting interceptors in individual box launchers that fire vertically, and the same launchers can be mounted on trucks or emplaced on the ground. The configuration appears both at the parade and in UFORCE marketing material.68 The Sting is a Ukrainian quadcopter interceptor built by Wild Hornets and fielded from spring 2025 against Shahed-type one-way attack drones.

    Sting Interceptor: Manufacturer Figures

    Takeoff weight4 kg ± 0.2 kg with payload
    Speed140 to 170 km/h cruise; 280 km/h maximum
    Altitude0 to 5,000 m operational; 7,000 m maximum
    Climb rate30 m/s
    Range37 km maximum; 18.5 km operating radius with return
    Endurance6 minutes at maximum speed; up to 15 minutes at cruise
    Warhead500 g payload with remote detonation initiation
    ControlELRS radio link, manually flown; daytime or thermal camera
    Unit cost$2,200 with thermal imaging camera

    Wild Hornets attaches a caveat to every range and endurance figure: each depends on battery capacity, weather, payload weight and operator flight style.69

    An MV11 holds station for seven days and the Sting it releases flies for 6 to 15 minutes. The vessel therefore covers a circle of roughly 37 km where the interceptor is expended, and roughly 18.5 km where it flies back to be recovered. Russia routes Shahed attacks against Odesa and other southern cities over the Black Sea, and an MV11 on that approach pushes the intercept line offshore by that distance. Where the hull sits decides what it protects.

    Interceptor Magazine Cost

    Eighteen Stings at the manufacturer's $2,200 come to roughly $39,600. A single Shahed is valued at between $48,000 and $100,000, so one intercept pays for the whole magazine. At the 80 to 90 percent hit rate Wild Hornets reports, a full load accounts for a target set worth roughly $700,000 to $1.6 million.69 The hull carries no published price.

    Wild Hornets markets an unqualified STING against a single specification table.69 H I Sutton recorded a refined Sting-II as the main known version in November 2025, advertised at 315 km/h against the 280 km/h on that table.70 A further Sting 2.0 entered combat testing in 2026 against jet-powered Russian drones, priced about 30 percent above the standard build and due an auto-detection function.71 The box launchers on the MV11 enclose the airframe, and no parade coverage identifies which of these sits inside them.

    UFORCE lists three combat-proven interceptors as integrated with its C2 ground station and deployable from Magura vessels. The Sting is not among them.74

    Interceptor Terminal guidance Published figures
    BULLET (partner product)Manual or semi-autonomous25 km range, up to 6,000 m, up to 320 km/h, 0.8 kg C4, 25 min flight time
    BUCHAAutonomous or semi-autonomous70 km maximum range, 30 km tactical range, up to 60 min flight time
    AIM-9 Sidewinder (partner product)Fully autonomousFour confirmed aerial kills from a vessel of this family

    The Sting runs in a different list on the same page, on the C2 ground station with more than 3,000 intercepts, all of them marked land engagements.74 A box launcher encloses the airframe, so the parade imagery cannot settle the type. The catalog carries no date and may predate the MV11 fit, and the product page already lags by omitting the MV11 altogether.

    What the Vessel Is For

    UFORCE opened with a wide mission list. The MV11 launches, resupplies and supports other unmanned systems far from shore, and the company added reconnaissance, surveillance, support to amphibious operations, and resupply of fuel and equipment to other naval drones. Chief executive Oleg Rogynskyy described a single carrier that transports and launches other unmanned systems far from shore, enabling operations across all domains.56 Defence Blog carried that statement, Militarnyi published its own account sourced to UFORCE, 24 Kanal cited Defence Blog citing UFORCE, and Dialog.UA cited Militarnyi, so one company statement reached readers four times before any independent assessment appeared.575861

    H I Sutton examined footage released by the President's Office and identified a MAGURA built to carry a large battery of interceptor drones, filling what he judged likely to be an offshore air-defense role.60 The deck load is visible in the footage. The role it serves was his inference, and he said so.

    UFORCE has since described the same fit. The company calls its most combat-effective configuration a fully autonomous short and medium range air-defense variant carrying several dozen interceptors, a gyrostabilized 12.7 mm turret and a full sensor suite for radar surveillance and target tracking, and offers it for protecting coastal zones and straits from aerial threats.6473 The carrier and resupply list covers what the same deck does on other sorties.

    TWZ read the parade imagery for the sensor fit and found a mast at the stern carrying a camera turret, a navigation radar and two horn-like antennas, a fixed forward camera on the bow, and a pair of satellite communications terminals in the open deck area.68 The air-defense variant adds the surveillance and tracking radar the parade hull lacks, and its 12.7 mm turret engages what the interceptors miss. The vessel that sailed on 24 August carried a navigation radar.

    TWZ counts 18 interceptors on the parade deck against the several dozen UFORCE describes in the air-defense variant. A partial load or a denser launcher arrangement would cover the difference, and no source addresses it.

    The Sting flies under a human operator on a radio link, and Wild Hornets sells it as an FPV interceptor with a two to six day conversion course for existing crews.69 Wild Hornets puts that operator up to 2,000 km from the launch point, working through an interface on a laptop, and TWZ found satellite communications terminals on the MV11's deck.6869 UFORCE runs the engagement from its C2 ground station, where a single operator moves the vessels, reads radar tracks of incoming aircraft and launches interceptors from one screen.74

    UFORCE grades terminal guidance across three levels. A manual interceptor needs constant stick control through the engagement. A semi-autonomous interceptor takes the operator's guidance to the vicinity and completes the attack itself. A fully autonomous interceptor launches and needs nothing further.74 BUCHA and the Sidewinder meet the fully autonomous description. A manually flown Sting does not, so the variant UFORCE describes and the load TWZ identified belong to different vessels.

    Dialog.UA reports in Russian, with no English-language equivalent, that the vessel will launch large numbers of aerial drones and substantially extend their flight range.61 UFORCE named no domain, so the narrowing to aerial drones belongs to the outlet. A short-range aerial drone released from a hull far offshore begins its mission at the launch point.

    The carrier role predates this hull. UFORCE already lists a mothership configuration for the MV7, carrying and launching a UAV for deep inland strikes before returning to base, and Magura crews flew that mission in combat from March 2026.59 The MV11 builds the role into a purpose-designed vessel at scale, alongside the wider architecture of drone motherships.

    Sources of the Published Figures

    Ten outlets covered the MV11 in the three days after the parade, at different points in a disclosure that moved, and their figures diverge accordingly.

    Figure Origin Status
    Payload 2,200 kg, endurance seven daysUFORCE, 24 August, via Defence Blog and MilitarnyiManufacturer statement, carried by every outlet
    Length 12 m, beam 3.5 m, range 2,000+ nm, 10 m³UFORCE project lead, 25 August, via Militarnyi and TextyManufacturer statement, not yet on the product page
    Length 7 mKyiv Post, 25 August, attributed to OboronkaNot in the Oboronka article, and against the manufacturer's 12 m
    18 Sting interceptors, mast and sensor fitTWZ, 25 August, from parade and marketing imageryObserved, and the only count of the demonstrated load
    Several dozen interceptors, 12.7 mm turret, tracking radarUFORCE, 25 August, via MilitarnyiStated intended fit; the parade hull carried a navigation radar
    Offshore air-defense roleNaval News, 25 August, inference from official footageInference, since corroborated by the manufacturer
    20 to 40 aircraft per launch waveKyiv Post, 25 August, its own deck-space estimateEstimate, labeled as such by the outlet
    Launches aerial drones and extends their rangeDialog.UA, 25 August, narrowing a UFORCE statementOutlet interpretation, no domain specified at source
    Three Magura-deployable interceptors, none of them the StingUFORCE INTERCEPT page, undatedManufacturer catalog, unreconciled with the Sting identification
    Sting specifications and costWild Hornets product page; relayed by TWZ and NewsweekManufacturer table, caveated on conditions72

    Navigating Where Satellites Do Not Work

    Ukraine has built a radio-beacon network along the Black Sea coast from Ochakiv to Izmail, named Maiachnia and running on a platform called Skyline. Deployment began late in 2025 at the initiative of the Prytula Foundation, the 12th Separate Special Purpose Center and the company TechnoTaras. The beacons operate autonomously, hold backup power and report into a central network that operators can adjust remotely.62

    Russian electronic warfare denies satellite navigation offshore, and an aircraft out of sight of land has no terrain to steer by. Euromaidan Press gives the distances: multirotor types become ineffective past roughly 25 km offshore, while fixed-wing aircraft hold a link at 40 km and beyond.63 The Sting is a multirotor, and its 18.5 km return radius sits inside that band.

    Maiachnia may serve only the aircraft a vessel launches. A hull can reach its launch box on its own navigation stack while the drones it releases depend on the beacons, and no source settles which the grid supports. Militarnyi illustrated its account of the network with a photograph of an interceptor launching from a Magura vessel and, separately, with a photograph of a Taras+ interceptor credited to the Prytula Foundation. Neither image is tied to the beacon grid in the text, and the interceptor in the Magura photograph goes unnamed.62 Only the MV11 carries a named interceptor load.

    Maiachnia runs as a coastal chain across the northwestern Black Sea and stops well short of the open water a 2,000 nautical mile range implies. Inertial, optical and celestial navigation, airborne relays and external cueing would all serve at that distance, and UFORCE has described none of them for this vessel.

    Unit Cost and Exchange Ratios

    What a Magura Costs

    A figure of $273,000 per Magura V5 appears across defense media and aggregator sites. Tracing it leads to Wikipedia and stops there. The figures that carry primary sourcing are lower. Simon Shuster, reporting for TIME in August 2024 with direct access to Ukrainian drone units and an underground production facility, gives Magura drones as costing "around $200,000 apiece."33

    The Group 13 commander addressed price in November 2024, and his words need quoting precisely because they are routinely overstated. The article reads: "Upon hearing the price tag of $230,000 per Magura V5, sourced from public data, he said it was lower, especially for Ukraine." The publication then adds its own reading, that this "likely means" $230,000 is the export price.6 The export interpretation belongs to the publication. The commander's own statement is narrower and negative: the public figure is too high, particularly for Ukraine. The same article records that Russian forces captured a Magura and valued it at around $250,000 from its internal components, which is an adversary's teardown rather than a price.

    Taken together, the V5 sits at roughly $200,000 to $250,000. Direct reporting and an adversary teardown bracket it from two independent directions, and the commander places Ukraine's own cost below the public figure without giving a number. No price has ever been published for the V7. The estimate used below, $350,000 to $500,000, is this site's own build-up from the V5 base plus the hull, the 270 horsepower diesel, the fuel system and the missile mounting, and it is the weakest quantitative input in this profile.

    Three Roles on One Accounting Rule

    The table below charges assets committed in full for every role. Recovery is unpublished for all three, and crediting one with reusability while denying it to the others would make the comparison meaningless.

    Role Assets committed Cost committed Target value Exchange
    Anti-ship, Feb 20246 x V5 hull and warheadapprox. $1,380,000$60m to $70m corvetteapprox. 45:1
    Air defense, May 2025up to 3 x V7 hull, 2 x AIM-9$1.45m to $2.30m$27m to $100m for two aircraft19:1 to 44:1
    Aerial drone carrier, Aug 20261 x V7 hull, several FPVsapprox. $355,000 to $520,000$15m Pantsir-S1approx. 29:1 to 42:1

    On a common rule the three roles sit closer together than the headline arithmetic suggests, and all three favor Ukraine. The 45 to 1 figure describes one attack that succeeded rather than a campaign exchange rate, because Ukraine has never published a per-attack success rate or a total of hulls lost, and the Sergey Kotov absorbed at least two earlier attacks before it sank. A campaign figure would charge those expenditures against the successes and would be worse by an unknown margin.

    The aircraft valuation deserves more care than it usually receives, because the exchange varies by almost a factor of six across the published band. Ukrainian intelligence valued the destroyed Su-30SM at $50 million.34 Disclosed contracts price the aircraft below that. Kazakhstan, buying on terms close to Russia's own, contracted for four Su-30SMs in 2014 at approximately 5 billion rubles, which is 1.25 billion rubles per aircraft.35 An Su-30MKI for Algeria was reported at 2 billion rubles in 2015.36 The ruble price of the aircraft barely moved across those contracts while its dollar equivalent moved by a factor of two, because the currency moved rather than the aircraft, which is why the ruble figures lead here. Converted at rates near the contract dates, a Su-30SM costs somewhere between about $14 million and about $33 million to replace.

    The Supply Chain Is the Constraint

    The ratios favor Ukraine at every point, and the ratios are not the interesting part. What separates the three roles is where the expended item comes from.

    Ukraine produces Magura hulls domestically and has an industrial base it can expand. It does not produce AIM-9s. A single AIM-9X Block II carries a US Selected Acquisition Report unit cost around $381,000, and a Block II Plus around $399,000, which is between roughly a quarter and a third of the total committed to the May 2025 engagement.37 Every surface-launched air-to-air engagement consumes a round from an allied stockpile whose release is a political decision taken in another capital, and the R-73 alternative draws on a finite inventory of Soviet-era missiles that is not being replenished. That dependency is structural and can be stated from sourced facts.

    What cannot be stated from sourced facts is that the dependency has bound operations. Fifteen months have passed since 2 May 2025 without another surface-launched air-to-air engagement, and several explanations fit that silence equally well: missile scarcity, Russian aircraft holding above the engagement envelope, engagements that happened without being publicized, and simple absence of opportunity. Separating them would require the number of missile-armed hulls available, the rounds allocated to them, or Russian tactical guidance on engagement altitude, and none of those is public.

    The carrier role points the other way. FPV drones cost thousands rather than hundreds of thousands, Ukraine builds them in very large numbers, and the boat is designed to come back. If a hull returns, the marginal cost of the next sortie falls to the price of the drones aboard, on the order of $5,000 to $20,000, which against a $15 million air-defense system would imply a ratio in the high hundreds to one. Whether these hulls return has not been published, and that single unknown moves the result by more than an order of magnitude. It is the most valuable missing number about this platform.

    Production and Export

    Two American Lines, One Licensed

    Red Cat Holdings announced a partnership on 14 May 2025 to build uncrewed surface vessels with an unnamed manufacturer. The company described a 7 meter vessel "tested daily in actual combat," and the illustration on its own website was recognizable as a Magura V7.38 Serial production began in early June 2026, by which point the craft was presented as an American design credited to the company's own engineers.39 Red Cat's position is that its Variant 7 is an independent development with structural and hardware differences from the original, American autonomous control and communications, and components meeting US defense sourcing requirements.

    UFORCE signed a memorandum with the American boatbuilder ReconCraft on 21 July 2026 at the Ukrainian Embassy in Washington.40 ReconCraft builds combatant craft for US and partner special operations forces and will use facilities in Oregon and South Carolina. Its co-founder stated a plan to produce hundreds and subsequently thousands of Magura naval drones annually, though the same reporting notes that capacity on that scale would require major funded orders from the United States, supplier expansion and standardized configurations. None of those three conditions was in place at signing, and no hull has been reported since.

    The sequence is the point. The unlicensed line reached serial production roughly seven weeks before the licensed one signed a memorandum. UFORCE distinguishes its position as the first naval drone company approved by the Ukrainian government for production in the United States, and Defense Express summarized the competitive position from the Ukrainian side without softening it: UFORCE has the path ahead from memorandum to first hull while the competitor already has a series, American electronics and a purchased company for swarm control.41 A combat record is the asset a copy cannot reproduce, and it is also the asset that depreciates fastest, because it describes performance against one adversary in one sea.

    First Employment Outside the Black Sea

    On 24 April 2026, US Army Green Berets of the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) launched a Magura against the decommissioned vessel MV Manfil off Itbayat in the Batanes archipelago during Exercise Balikatan.42 The target sank. Early reporting declined to name the manufacturer, noting the craft resembled both Ukrainian Magura drones and US Red Cat platforms with neither connection confirmed. H I Sutton identified a Magura from the released Department of Defense photographs on 2 May and assessed the model as possibly the V7.1 or V7.2.43 UFORCE confirmed its participation on 8 June.44

    The warhead is the technically novel element: a single large forward-facing explosively formed penetrator surrounded by seven smaller elements angled slightly outward. A conventional shaped charge is optimized for perpendicular impact and loses much of its penetration off that axis. A craft riding a sea surface cannot control the angle at which it arrives, and the multi-element array trades peak penetration for tolerance of the geometry it actually gets.

    Itbayat sits in the Luzon Strait roughly 160 km south of Taiwan. Demonstrating a combat-proven sea-denial weapon in that chokepoint is a different statement from demonstrating it in the Black Sea, and it follows the same pattern as the first American combat employment of uncrewed surface vessels covered in this site's Saronic Corsair profile.

    The Pentagon Competition

    The Defense Innovation Unit opened its Suitable Warfighting Adaptive Payloads challenge, SWAP-USV, at the end of July 2026. It carries $100 million in prize money across three sprints, $40 million, $40 million and $20 million, with a separate potential procurement budget of $200 million for companies that clear each phase.45 The $300 million figure that appears in some coverage adds the two together. Sprint 1 requires in-water testing in autumn 2026 with a mission-ready system delivered within 29 days.46

    The requirement asks for a vessel carrying two or more mature aerial drones with a combined payload of at least 2 kg, including recoverable and one-way types, able to shadow a vessel of interest autonomously and intercept a non-cooperative maneuvering vessel, and deployable within 120 days in a standard cargo container or aboard C-17 and C-130 transports. That description matches what Group 13 was already doing off Crimea, which is why UFORCE spent August promoting those strikes.

    A modernized V7.2 was trialled at Portuguese maritime ranges near Tróia and Sesimbra during NATO's Dynamic Messenger and REPMUS exercise in September 2025, with a reinforced hull, missile launchers moved from the stern to a mid-deck position and a satellite and inertial navigation package described as less vulnerable to jamming.47 Sutton states that the V7.2 is built in Portugal. No manufacturing agreement with any Portuguese yard has been announced, and UFORCE is reported to be building European factories at undisclosed locations, so the testing is established and the manufacture is not.

    Countermeasures and Limits

    Russia Answered with Cheaper Things

    On 29 or 30 May 2024 an FPV quadcopter destroyed a Magura V5 in the north-western Black Sea, the first documented case of an aerial drone killing an uncrewed surface vessel.19 That produced a stark reversal in the economics of the exchange, since a quadcopter costing hundreds of dollars destroyed a boat costing over $200,000. It is the first documented FPV kill of a Magura rather than the first cheap Russian weapon to score against one. It did not stop the Magura, and the reason is worth stating precisely: an FPV needs a launch point within a few tens of kilometers of its target, so the defense works only close inshore.

    Russian adaptation since has been layered rather than novel. Ships were dispersed and relocated, anti-drone netting was installed, mobile task forces were formed, and unmanned systems regiments were created under the navy, part of the wider restructuring covered in this site's profile of Russia's Unmanned Systems Forces.48 Anti-drone defenses were fitted to Russian nuclear submarines thousands of miles from Ukraine.49

    Russia has also turned a land-attack weapon on Ukrainian boats. On 25 May 2026 a Geran-2 struck a Ukrainian Navy vessel near Yuzhne outside Odesa and killed all four crew.50 Using a loitering munition optimized against fixed infrastructure to hunt a moving small craft requires real-time course correction and extended tracking, and it shows that the maritime drone contest now runs in both directions.

    What the Platform Cannot Do

    Three limitations recur across independent assessments. The craft depends on satellite and mesh communications in a theater saturated with electronic warfare, and its answer is redundancy rather than immunity. Its operating limit of 1.25 meter waves binds it to conditions that constrain small boats generally. And the strike variants carry no radar; only the reconnaissance-oriented V6P is reported with a surface search set.

    The consequence for employment is that a Magura is a delivery system pointed at a target somebody else found. That was adequate against ships at known moorings and it is adequate against fixed air-defense sites. It would not be adequate for open-ocean interdiction against a maneuvering target, which is precisely the autonomy the Pentagon competition asks bidders to demonstrate.

    The Craft Recovered off Greece

    On 7 May 2026 Greek fishermen found a 5 meter black uncrewed surface vessel with its engine still running in a sea cave off Cape Doukato near Lefkada, in the Ionian Sea.51 It carried three bow cameras, a Starlink antenna, electro-optical surveillance equipment and long-range communications hardware. Greek reporting identified it as a Ukrainian Magura V3.

    UFORCE rejected that five days later, and the wording bears on the family's designations as well as on this craft: "the vessel found near Lefkada is not a Magura drone. Although it bears a superficial visual resemblance to Magura-type systems, its design, construction, and apparent technical specifications do not correspond to any option in our product line." The company added that it "has never produced a V3 version, such a model does not exist."3 Greek media later reported investigators leaning toward a Ukrainian-made Kozak Mamai.

    Ukraine's position moved over the following month. The Foreign Ministry first said there was no evidence the craft belonged to Ukrainian naval drone operators.52 On 6 June its spokesman expressed Ukraine's apologies for the incident, attributing it to circumstances caused by Russian aggression while emphasizing Ukraine's commitment to civilian maritime safety.53 An apology for an incident is not an identification of a craft, and none has been supplied. A claim that the vessel carried approximately 300 kg of explosives came from a retired naval officer speaking to a news site and was contradicted by later reporting describing detonators and no explosives.

    The incident belongs to a pattern. A US-made naval drone with an active warhead washed up in northern Turkey on or before 23 March 2026 and was destroyed in place.54 Two uncrewed craft reaching NATO territory within seven weeks raises the same question about control of a Magura outside the water it was built for.

    Assessment

    The MAGURA family did what a navy-less state needed it to do, and it did so against a target set that has since moved out of reach. Three warships in five weeks in early 2024 remains the most productive stretch any uncrewed surface vessel has had, and the record since is one of adaptation rather than repetition.

    The platform's roles overlap rather than succeed one another. Anti-surface strike continued into at least May 2024, the air-defense fit appeared in the same period, and aerial drone carriage began in 2026 while the earlier capabilities remained aboard. Reading that sequence as a chain in which each mission replaced an exhausted predecessor overstates what the public record shows.

    What will decide the platform's next three years is supply rather than performance. Ukraine builds the hulls and can build more. It cannot build the Sidewinders that made the air-defense role historic, and no further surface-launched air-to-air engagement has been reported since May 2025. It can build aerial drones in very large numbers at low cost, which is why the carrier role is the one now being marketed to the Pentagon and the one most likely to spread. The MV11 unveiled on 24 August 2026 is consistent with that direction, a hull built for the carrier role rather than adapted to it, though a vessel shown six days after this assessment was written was plainly in development long before it and settles nothing on its own. The MV11 fits that pattern. A 12 meter hull rated beyond 2,000 nautical miles, carrying interceptors that cost $2,200 each and come off Ukrainian lines at up to 10,000 a month, puts air defense on the supply chain Ukraine already controls. The air-to-air fit never had that, which is why this configuration can scale where the Sidewinder could not.

    Related Research

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